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Abstract- A simple way of creating new and efficient 
distinguishers for cryptographic primitives such as 
block ciphers or hash functions is introduced. This 
technique is then successfully applied over reduced 
round versions of the block cipher TEA, which is 
proven to be weak with less than five rounds. 
1 Introduction 
The construction of a distinguisher [I]  (i.e. an 
algorithm that is able of distinguishing a random 
permutation or random mapping from a given 
cryptographic primitive such as a block cipher or hash 
function) is one of the objectives of a cryptanalyst. 
Although a distinguisher may or may not be used to 
recover some of the plaintext or key bits, the existence of 
an efficient and effective distinguisher always means the 
cryptographic primitive in question is weak [1,2] and 
must be discarded for any cryptographic usage. 
1.1 The block cipher TEA 
TEA stands for Tiny Encryption Algorithm. It is the 
name of a block cipher invented by David Wheeler and 
Roger Needham, members of the Computer Security 
Laboratory of Cambridge University. It was presented in 
the 1994 Fast Software Encryption Workshop [3]. 
TEA is a very fast block cipher that does not use 
predefined tables or S-boxes and does not need much 
initialisation time. It  is a Feistel type algorithm It works 
over 64 bit blocks and uses keys of 128 bits. They authors 
say it  has a security (with 8, 16 or 32 rounds) at least 
comparable with DES (the Data Encryption Standard), 
and it is quite faster. 
However, in the light of some recent results [4,5] this 
assertion seems to be extremely optimistic. It is very 
portable, simple and efficient as its compact code shows: 
void code(long* v, long* w,long* k) 
{ unsigned long y=v[O], z=v[I], sum=O, 
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delta=Ox9e3779b9, n=32; 
while (n-->O) 
{ sum += delta ; 
y+=(z<<4)+k[0]"z+sumA(z>>5)+k[ I]; 
z+=(y<<4)+k[2]"y+sumA(y>>5)+k[3]; 
I 
w[O]=y; w[l]=z; 
i 
1.2 Overview 
Our method is based in the search for subsets of the 
input space that produce a high (statistically significant) 
deviation of the distribution of a given subset of the 
output produced by a given cryptographic primitive. 
For this search we use a genetic-algorithm based 
approach in which individuals of the population codify bit 
masks that are used to perform a logical AND with 
randomly generated inputs. 
In this way, we get an extremely efficient 
representation- of those input subsets characterized by 
having some of the input bits fixed to a zero value. Input 
subsets of this form are evaluated performing chi-square 
tests over the output distribution of the subset under 
observation. 
These tests vary, because additional rounds of TEA 
exponentially increase the dispersion of the output, and 
thus the difficulty of finding significant deviations. 
The genetic algorithm will evolve individuals and 
populations towards those that, by fixing the input bits 
that have a greater effect over the observed output, 
produce a higher deviation from the expected probability 
distribution. 
2 Results 
We will briefly present the different approximations 
used in every case and the results obtained over them, 
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proposing efficient distinguishers for all these versions of 
the algorithm. 
2.1 One round TEA 
Every input subset (or bitmask) is tested by generating 
2” random inputs and then performing a logical AND 
between each of these inputs and the bitmask. Then TEA I 
is applied over thus generated vectors, and the values of 
the least significant eight bits of the first output word of 
TEA, that is w[0]&255, are computed. 
We have focused in this particular part of the output 
because there are authors, notably [6],  that have shown 
that block ciphers using rotation as one of their round 
operations (as is the case of TEA) tend to exhibit bad 
distributions in their least significant hits of their output 
words. The fitness function we propose for the genetic 
algorithm is highly related with the chi-square statistic x2 
which in our case measures the deviation of the observed 
output distribution from a uniform, in this way: 
if x2 = 522480 then fitness = w4 
else jtness = ,yz 
The idea behind this fitness function is that the value 
of the chi square statistic cannot increase indefinitely, but 
has a maximum. The maximum value of the chi square 
statistic corresponding to a distribution with 255 degrees 
of freedom and 2” observations is precisely 522480, 
which is obtained when all the possible 256 outputs 
collapse in a single one. 
Once we find bitinasks that produce this maximum 
deviation, our search must continue by looking for those 
bitmasks that are heavier (have more l’s), and this is the 
reason of including the weight M’ in the formula above, 
once the maximum deviation is obtained. 
Heavier bitmasks are preferred because they allow for 
a larger set of different inputs, so in this sense we can say 
they are more general, and also give more information 
about the input subset (the 0’s in the bitmask or inactive 
bits) that has a stronger influence over the observed 
output. 
Obviously, we mnst try to maximise this fitness value. 
The code we used for testing was the implementation of 
the genetic algorithm of William M. Spears, from the 
Navy Center for Applied Research. Other parameters 
needed for running the genetic algorithm are the size of 
the population, the mutation rate and the crossover 
probability. Those values were fixed, respectively, to 100, 
0.005 and 0.85 after some trial and error testing that 
showed they produced good results. 
The hest bitmask we found after around 1000 
generations and 90000 evaluations for the fitness function 
presented above was m,: 
{O~FFFFEFOO,OXFFFFEOOO,OXFFFFFEOO,OXFFFFFFOO~ 
OxFFFFFFFF,OxFFFFFFFF} 
which has a weight of 153 and produces a chi square 
of 522240. 
It was then tested with different, previously unseen 
input subsets of size 2” and in every case it produced 
maximal deviations, (i.e. a collapse of the output). This 
hitmask can he used to construct an exceptionally 
efficient and simple distinguisher for TEAI, which 
pseudocode is presented below: 
INPUT: F: Z2Iy2 + Z2M, a random mapping or TEAl 
ALGORITHM: 
Generate a random vector v E Z2I9> 
Apply the mask ml, getting v’= v&ml which 
can take any of 2”’ possible values 
Compute F(v’)=w[O]w[l] 
Compute r = w[0]&255 
OUTPUT: If r=l85 then F is TEAl else F is not TEAl 
It is interesting to point out that this distinguisher is 
extremely efficient, given that with only one input text 
has a false positivr probability of 1/256 (or around 0.4%) 
and a zero probability of false negatives. 
2.2 Two rounds TEA 
TEA with two rounds (TEA2) is much harder than 
TEAl. The additional round significantly increases the 
strength of the algorithm and no usable bitmaks 
producing maximal deviation (collapses) were found, so 
the fitness function used for TEA 1 is not adequate here. 
Although a fitness function consisting simply of the 
chi-square statistic can break TEA2, it needs some extra 
care with technical details (mainly a selection 
proportional to rank and not to fitness and different 
mutation and crossover probabilities) to produce good 
results. Another drawback of this fitness function is that 
it shows a very low convergence towards good solutions 
(those which produce results statistically better than can 
be expected at random). 
Furthermore, this simplistic approximation is not 
applicable to TEA3. So, afler solving the case for TEA3, 
we turned hack to TEA2 and observed that the same 
fitness function would be very adequate, so we will 
present now a new fitness Function that reflects an idea 
that is enough for breaking both TEA2 and TEA3. The 
fitness function used in this case is shown below: 
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if xz 2 403.4579 then fitness = l;w3 + w4 
else jitness = ]/w3 
The idea behind this fitness function is to divide the 
search for good and heavy bitmasks in two phases. In the 
first one, the chi-square values will be around the 0.5 
percentile, and the fitness function above will simply look 
for low-weighted bitmasks. When the bitmasks are 
sufficiently low to produce high values of the chi square 
statistic (above the threshold of 403.4579), then the 
objective is to find heavier bitmasks between those which 
produce a very high statistical value (Table 1 shows some 
p-values of a chi-square distribution with 255 degrees of 
freedom). 
In this way, we do not maximize the chi-square value 
but the weight of the masks that produce a statistic value 
over a threshold. In this ‘case, the threshold is ‘the 
corresponding value for a chi-square distribution with 255 
degrees of freedom and a p-value of 5*10-9, so it clearly 
shows a very strong deviation from randomness. 
Apply mask ml to every vector vi, getting vi’=v,&m2 
that can take any of 215’ possible values 
Compute F(vi’)= w[O], w[l]i 
Compute 6 = w[0li &255 
Perform a chi-square test for checking if the observed 
distribution of ri is consistent with the expected 
uniform distribution, calculating the corresponding 
chi-square statistic x2 
OUTPUT: If x2> 390.0315.then F is TEA2 else F is 
not TEA2 
The 390.03 15 is the value corresponding to a p-value 
of IO-’, so the distinguisher described before will have a 
false positive probability of IO-’ and a false negative 
probability even closer to zero. 
2.3 Three rounds TEA 
Using essentially the same approximation described 
before, we get the following bitmask m3 for TEA with 3 
rounds after around 750 generations and 63000 
evaluations 
{OxFFE 1F040,OxFCE70446,OxFFEFFO6E,OxFFE7F42A, 
OxFFBF 1825,OxFFFA0064} 
0.5 254.33 
lo-2 
10” 
1 o4 
310.45 
330.51 
347.65 
which has a weight of 116 and produces an average chi- 
square statistic of 393.6 over previously unseen cases. 
lo-s 362.98 The distinguisher will be, then 
64 INPUT F: ZZI9’ + Z2 , a random mapping or TEA3 
ALGORITHM: 
Generate 2” random vectors vi E Z219Z 
Apply mask m3 to every vector vi, getting vi’=vi&m3 
that can take any of 2Il6 possible values 
Compute F(h’)= w[O]i w[l]i 
Compute ri = w[0li &255 
Perform a chi-square test for checking if the observed 
distribution of ri is consistent with the expected 
uniform distribution, calculating the corresponding 
chi-square statistic x2 
OUTPUT: If x2> 330.5197 then F is TEA3 else F is 
not TEA3 
Table 1: Some p-values for a chi-square statistic with 255 
degrees of freedom 
Using this approximation, we got the following 
bitmask m2 after around 800 generations and 70000 
evaluations 
. ,  
{ OxBFFFFOFA,OxFFFE738X,OxFFFFF7F8,OxFFFFF3F8, 
OxFFFFEF85,OxFFFFFFXCJ 
The 330.5197 is the value corresuondina to a D-value which has a weight of 155. - 
of 
probability of 
around 0.5% 
so this distinguisher will have a false positive 
and a false negative probability of After testing this bitmask with other previously unseen inputs, the average chi square statistic obtained was 
736.05. It is then feasible to construct an efficient 
distinguisher for TEA2, as shown in the following 
oseudocode: 
2.4 Four rounds TEA 
INPUT: F: Z2I9’ + Z2@, a random mapping or TEA2 
ALGORITHM: 
Generate 2” random vectors.vi E Z2I9’ This is a considerably harder case. When using the 
same approximation that was successful over the prior 
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two cases, we only managed to obtain bitmasks of 
relatively low weight, not more than 47. 
This is interesting and can be useful for different 
cryptanalytic purposes, for example for starting a search 
of impossible differentials, hut it is not enough in this 
case, as it does not allow for 264 different inputs. If not 
having at least 2@ different elements in the input subset, 
we can not ask to obtain a good distribution of the output, 
as i t  must’somehow reflect the low entropy of the input 
(although it do not need to be precisely in w[O]&255, the 
bits we observe). 
So we need a different approximation, a subtler one, 
able of distinguishing from randomness behaviours that 
may have past undetected by other, less sensible, tests. 
Our proposal is based in a test used to measure the 
Strict Avalanche Criterion or SAC [7]. The SAC will be 
measured just by flipping at random a bit that is at a 
position where there is an active hit (i.e. one that has a 1 
in the corresponding input mask), then measuring the 
Hamming distance of the two outputs. 
A mapping Z,” + Z,” bas the SAC over a certain input 
subset S E Z,” iff the Hamming distance of the output of 
inputs x and x ’  that only differ in a position (i.e. 
w(x@.r’)=I) and belong to the input subset S follow a 
Binomial distribution with parameters %. and n.  
In the case of TEA, we should have a B(1/2,64). It is 
important to note that the satisfactibily of this criterion 
implies the avalanche effect (changes in the input of only 
one bit should produce a change of around half of the 
output), because the average of the distribution B(U2,n) is 
n/2. 
For testing if a given bitmask represents an input 
subset which elements meet the SAC, we propose to 
perform a chi-square ?est for the goodness of tit of the 
observed output distribution of the Hamming values with 
respect to the theoretical Binomial distribution. 
In this case, we have a chi square statistic with 64 
degrees of freedom. Table 2 shows some p-values of this 
distribution. 
1 o4 
1 o 5  
114.83 
124.10 
Table 2: Some p-values for a chi-square statistic with 64 
degrees of freedom 
Using this approximation, we got the following 
bitmask md 
(0x96922AOC,Ox42C06402.0x35B 1 1OO1,Ox97OOOOOO,Ox 
FOOOOOOl ,OxBEBOOOOI} 
with a weight of 50 (the weight is not a limit here, as far 
as sufficiently many input elements exist to perform the 
test), a fitness of 420.95 and an average chi-square value 
over previously unseen examples of 294.86. 
In this case, we did not introduced any preference for 
heavier bitmasks. The corresponding distinguisher 
pseudocode will then he: 
64 INPUT: F: Z119’ + Z2 , a random mapping or TEA4 
ALGORITHM: 
Generate2” random vectors vi E Z2I9’ 
Apply mask mr to every vi, getting vi’= vi&m4 that can 
take 2’” possible values 
For every vj’ 
Select a position p at random from those that 
have a 1 in the hitmask (active positions) 
Generate vi” by changing the value of vi’ at 
position p 
End For 
Compute fi =H(F(v,’), F(vi”)), the Hamming distance 
between F(v<) and F(vi”) 
Perform a chi-square test for checking if the observed 
distribution of ri is consistent with the expected 
distribution, calculating the corresponding chi-square 
statistic x2 
OUTPUT: 1f~2>148.3564 then F is TEA4 else F is not 
TEA4 
where 148.3564 is the threshold value corresponding 
to a p-value of 10.’. The distinguisher will, then; have a 
false positive probability of 10.’ and a negligible false 
negative probability. 
3 Conclusions 
We have presented a new method of constructine 
dihlingulshurs for cryptographic msppinga such a i  block 
ciphers or hash lunrlions, \\(hicl1 has been pro\en useful. 
0.5 63.3.7 
lo-? 
io5 
93.21 
104.71 
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This method is applied over reduced round variants of 
the block cipher TEA, which is proved to be weak with 
less than five rounds. 
Furthermore, the distinguishers obtained are very 
efficient, needing very few inputs to obtain high 
distinguishing probabilities. In the case of TEA1 we only 
need one text to obtain a high distinguishing probability, 
and even with TEA4 we manage to construct a 
distinguisher that only needs 2” texts. 
Moreover, these output distributions discovered with 
the aid of genetic algorithms and used to construct the 
distinguishers, could also be useful in future attacks for 
recovering part of the plaintext or key bits, as in [ 11. 
Additionally, this attack could help in avoiding pitfalls 
while designing new cryptographic primitives. For 
example, if we substitute in the TEA code all operations 
by additions, the resulting cipher is slightly weaker than 
the original, as proved by the possibility of extending this 
attack to 5 rounds. If, on the other hand, we change all 
operations by xor’s, the final cipher is much weaker than 
the original, because this attack scheme could find 
distinguishers even with 128 rounds. 
So, in a way, and by using this attack technique, we 
can give reasons to support the exact combination of 
additions and xor’s proposed by TEA designers. 
Finally, these results clearly show that the block cipher 
TEA with less than five rounds is not robust enough as to 
being useful for any cryptographic purposes. 
Although we acknowledge that previous works, 
specially [ 5 ]  have shown that TEA cannot be considered a 
secure block cipher, and have presented stronger attacks 
on it, we still think the proposed approach deserves merit 
because it is the first published attack using A1 techniques 
that is able of producing worthy cryptanalytic results 
when confronted against modem ciphers. 
Acknowledgments 
This research was supported by project TIC2002-04498- 
CO54 of the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia. 
References 
[ I ]  L. Knudsen and W. Meier 
Correlations in RC6 with a Reduced Number of Rounds. 
Proceedings of the Seventh Fast Software Encryption 
Workshop, Springer-Verlag. 2000 
[2] T. Shimoyama, K. Takeuchi, J. Hayakawa 
Correlation Attack to the block cipher RC5 and the 
simplified variants of RC6, Third AES Candidate 
Conference AES3,2000 
[3] D. Wheeler, R. Needham 
TEA, A Tiny Encryption Algorithm, Proceedings of the 
1995 Fast Software Encryption Workshop. pp. 97-1 I O  
Springer-Verlag. 1995 
[4] David Wagner, John Kelsey, Bruce Schneier 
Related-Key cryptoanalysis of 3-WAY. Biham-DES, 
CAST, DES-X, NewDES, RC2 and TEA, Proceedings of 
the IClCS’97 Conference, pp. 233-246, Springer-Verlag, 
1997. 
[5]Dukjae Moon, Kyungdeok Hwang, Wonil Lee, Sangjin 
Lee and Jongim Lim. 
Impossible Differential Clyptanalysis of Reduced Round 
XTEA and TEA. Fast Software Encryption, FSE 2002, 
Leuven, Belgium, February 4-6, 2002. Springer LNCS, 
v.2365. pp 49-60 
[6] John Kelsey, Bruce Schneier, David Wagner 
Mod n cryptoanalysis with applications against RC5P and 
M6, Proceedings of the 1999 Fast Software Encryption 
Workshop, pp. 139-155 Springer-Verlag. 1999. 
[7] R. Forre 
The Strict Avalanche Criterion: Special Properties of 
Boolean Functions and Extended Definition. Advances in 
Cryptology - CRYPTOSX, vol. 403, pp. 450-468.LNCS 
Springer-Verlag, 1988 
2193 
Authorized licensed use limited to: Univ Carlos III. Downloaded on March 26, 2009 at 11:07 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
